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INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)' and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June 1, 2011
to May 31, 2012.2

II. RECENT LEGISLATION: THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
ENFORCEMENT ACT

Beginning January 1, 2012, private employers with more than 500
employees3 were required to begin using
the federal work authorization
program, also known as "E-Verify.M Effective July 1, 2012, private
employers with more than 100 employees were required to use EVerify.'
These new requirements have been gradually phased in
pursuant to House Bill 87,6 also known as The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, which was signed by Governor
Nathan Deal on May 13, 2011. 7 The last remaining E-Verify provision,
requiring compliance by employers with more than ten employees, takes
effect on July 1, 2013.8

1. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2011);
BARBARA T. LINDEMAN &PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw (C. Geoffrey
Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009); Patrick L. Coyle et al., Labor and
Employment, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 63 MERCER L. REv. 1309 (2012); Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, Daily Labor Report, BNA-com, available at http://www.bna.com (last visited Aug.
4, 2011). Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the latest developments in
federal labor and employment law. Rather, this Article only covers legislative and judicial
developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey period.
2. For an analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas IlI et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
63 MERCER L. REV. 197 (2011).
3. O.C.G.A. § 36-60-6 (2012).
4. O.C.G.A. § 13-10-90 (2010 & Supp. 2012).
5. O.C.G.k § 36-60-6.
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 87, Reg. Sess. (2011) (codified in relevant parts at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-10-90,
36-60-6).
7. Id.
8. O.C.GA § 36-60-6.
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PENDING LEGISLATION: DRUG TESTING FOR CONTINUED
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Although not enacted in the 2012 Georgia legislative session, the
following public law represents a potential trend for employer-employee
legislation in coming years. Georgia House Bill 697,9 which is still in
committee, would amend Article 7 of Chapter 8 of Title 34 of the
O.C.G.A. if it is ultimately enacted.1" This legislation would institute
a random drug testing program as a required condition for continuing to
receive unemployment compensation benefits." Recipients of unemployment compensation would lose their benefits for up to two years for
either a failure to comply with the testing or for testing positive for a
prohibited substance. 2
IV.

WRONGFUL TERMINATION

A.

Employment At-Will
At-will employment refers to employment that either an employer or
an employee may terminate at any time with or without cause.13 While
employment at-will in other jurisdictions may be weakening, 14 in
Georgia the presumption remains that all employment is at-will unless
a statutory or contractual exception exists.'" "[Tihis bar to wrongful
discharge claims in the at-will employment context 'is a fundamental
statutory rule governing employer-employee relations in Georgia. '""6
Particularly, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1"7 provides that "[a]n indefinite hiring"
is at-will employment.'" The definition of an indefinite hiring includes

9. Ga. H.R. Bill 697, Reg. Sess. (2012) (unenacted).
10. Id. § 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009).
14. Haas et al., supra note 2, at 201 n.38 ("'Tihe employment-at-will doctrine is
weakening in many jurisdictions.'") (quoting W. Melvin Haas I et al., Labor and
Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 62 MERCER L. REV. 181,186 n.37 (2010))
(alteration in original).
15.

See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178, 179,590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003)

(noting "[in the absence of a contractual or statutory 'for cause' requirement ... the
employee serves 'at will' and may be discharged at any time for any reason or no reason
16.
Reilly
17.
18.

Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 172, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005) (quoting
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000)).
O.C.GA § 34-7-1 (2008).
Id.
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contract provisions specifying "'permanent employment,' 'employment for
life,' [and] 'employment until retirement.'"'19 Further, a contract
specifying an annual salary does not create a definite period of
employment.20 However, if an employment contract does specify a
definite period of employment, any employment beyond that period
becomes employment at-will subject to discharge without cause.2
Regardless of an employer's motives, the general rule in Georgia
allows the discharge of an at-will employee without creating a cause of
action for wrongful termination.22 Oral promises between an employer
two; absent
and employee will not modify the relationship between the
23
a written contract, an employee's status remains at-will.
B.

Wrongful Termination Based upon Allegations of Fraud

In Bailey v. Urology Center of Columbus, LLC,2 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia determined that an
employer's alleged assurance of an employee's job security did not
amount to fraudulent misrepresentation when the employee was later
terminated.25 Bailey alleged that a manager for her employer represented that Bailey's "job was safe" in December 2009.26 Following the
alleged assurance, Bailey purchased a house. In March 2010, Bailey was
terminated. She then claimed that her employer already had decided to
terminate her at the time of the representation. Bailey brought suit
against her former employer, claiming fraudulent misrepresentation.27
Bailey's claim was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.28 The court noted that "[an indefi29
Bailey failed
nite hiring may be terminated at will by either party."
to allege that she had an employment contract with her employer for a

19. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443-44(1978) (quoting
Land v. Delta Air Lines, 130 Ga. App. 231, 232, 203 S.E.2d 316, 317-18 (1973)).
20. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271,273,444 S.E.2d 351,353 (1994).
21. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148, 534 S.E.2d 533,
534 (2000).
22. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App.
363, 365, 649 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) (noting "[t]he employer[] with or without cause and
regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability").
23. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004).
24. No. 4:11-CV-42, 2011 WL 3568144, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2011).
25. Id. at *4-5.
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id.
28. Id at *4.
29. Id. at *5; see also O.C.GA § 34-7-1.
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specified time period.30 Consequently, Bailey could not rely on her
employer's alleged representation because as an at-will employee the
representation was unenforceable. 3'
C.

Breach of Contract (Other than At-will Contracts)

The basic rules of contract law apply in creating a valid employment
contract: competency to contract, offer, acceptance, and valid consideration.32 Further, for an employment contract to be valid, the terms
must define the nature and character of the services to be performed, the
place of employment, the time period for which the employee is to work,
and the compensation to be owed to the employee.'
In addition, an
employment contract's enforceability requires sufficient definitiveness in
the terms of the contract.' 4
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed that
basic contract rules, including the statute of frauds, apply to the
formation of an employment contract. In Bithoney v. Fulton-DeKalb
HospitalAuthority,35 the court examined whether an oral agreement for
a fifteen-month severance package was enforceable under the statute of
frauds.36 Bithoney engaged in multiple discussions about moving from
New York to Georgia to take an executive position with Grady Hospital.
Additionally, on multiple occasions, Bithoney met with members of the
Board of Trustees of the Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority, the
governing authority for Grady Hospital. At one of the meetings, the
chair of the board told Bithoney, "Welcome to the Grady family, we are
looking forward to your joining us."37 Bithoney received a draft
employment contract from Grady that provided for a fifteen-month
severance pay package if he was terminated. Moreover, Grady provided
Bithoney with an offer letter to confirm the initial employment status
and to serve as a framework for a subsequent formal contract. However,
the fifteen-month severance term was missing from the offer letter.
Bithoney moved to Georgia without having a formal employment
agreement in place. The night before he was to begin work, he was
informed that the board of trustees blocked his employment and he

30. Bailey, 2011 WL 3568144, at *5.
31. Id.
32. JAMES W. WIMBERLY JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2:1 (4th ed. 2008).
33. Id. For a discussion of elements of employer-employee contracts, see infra Part
1V.A_ of this Article.
34. WIMBERLY, supra note 32.
35. 313 Ga. App. 335, 721 S.E.2d 577 (2011).
36. Id. at 337-39, 721 S.E.2d at 579-80.
37. Id. at 337, 721 S.E.2d at 579.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

178

[Vol. 64

would not be working for Grady. Bithoney filed suit alleging breach of
contract pursuant to an oral contract for the fifteen-month severance
package and negligent misrepresentation pursuant to the chair of the
board's welcoming statement.8
The court upheld the trial court's ruling that "enforcement of the oral
severance agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds." 9 Agreements that cannot be performed within one year of their making must
be in writing and signed by the charged party.40 The court noted that
"[tlo fall within the ambit of this statutory provision, a contract must be
Bithoney's oral
incapable of being performed within a year."4 '
and
the
statute
of frauds
agreement
was
for
fifteen
months,
severance
was applicable. 42 The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer.4
D. The Georgia Whistleblower Act
Under the Georgia Whistleblower Act," "[n]o public employer shall
retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or
a government agency ...

In Caldon v. Board of Regents of the

.'
46

University System of Georgia, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined
whether a close temporal proximity between a public employee's
complaints and her termination was sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether the employer's motive was pretextual.47 Caldon claimed that she engaged in whistleblowing activity in
July and August of 2008 by discussing concerns that her boss was underreporting leave time, reporting a conflict of interest, complaining of
wasteful spending practices, and voicing concerns over her boss's ability
to handle his job responsibilities. On September 24, 2008, Caldon
verbally berated her boss in front of other employees. That same day,
Caldon was given the option to resign or be terminated. Caldon initially
resigned, but later withdrew her resignation and filed for a review.4'

38. Id. at 336-39, 721 S.E.2d at 579-81.
39. Id. at 343, 721 S.E.2d at 583.
40. Id. at 341, 721 S.E.2d at 582.
41. Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 336, 721 S.E.2d at 579.
O.C.G-A § 45-1-4 (Supp. 2012).
Id.
311 Ga. App. 155, 715 S.E.2d 487 (2011).
Id. at 159, 715 S.E.2d at 490.
Id. at 156-58, 715 S.E.2d at 488-89.
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The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer.49 The
employer provided direct evidence that Caldon was fired for insubordination based on her September 24 exchange with her boss. 50 Other
employees heard the exchange and another executive recommended that
Caldon be terminated for insubordination without knowledge of the
alleged whistleblowing activities.51 In some cases, "temporal proximity
could be sufficient to establish a question of fact with regard to the
stated reason for termination, in this case, however, it is not sufficient
to overcome the Board's direct evidence that Caldon was terminated for
her insubordination."5 2
V. NEGLIGENT HIRING OR RETENTION

Under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20," 3 "[tihe employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency.... ."5' The Georgia Court of Appeals has

held that this statute imposes a duty on the employer to "Warn other
employees of dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows
or ought to know but which are unknown to the employee."' 5 For a
plaintiff to sustain an action for negligent hiring or retention, the
plaintiff must show that the employer hired an individual who "the
employer knew or should have known posed a risk of harm to others
where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the employee's 'tendencies'
or propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained
by the plaintiff."6
Typicaly, "the determination of whether an
"7
employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a jury issue 1
and is only a question of law "'where the evidence is plain, palpable and
undisputable."'5 5

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 160, 715 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 159-60, 715 S.E.2d at 490-91.
Id. at 160, 715 S.E.2d at 491.
Id.; See, e.g., McNorton v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1378 n.22

(N.D. Ga. 2007).

53. O.C.G.A § 34-7-20 (2008).
54. Id.
55. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001);

see also O.C.GA § 34-7-20.
56. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004).

57. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
58. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga.
735, 739, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1997)).
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During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in
Novare Group, Inc. v. Sari09 that to sustain a negligent supervision
claim, there must be "'sufficient evidence to establish that the employer
reasonably knew or should have known of an employee's tendencies to
engage in certain behavior relevant to the injuries allegedly incurred by
the plaintiff."'6 0
In Novare, condominium purchasers alleged that
brokers, acting on behalf of developers, promised them "spectacular city
views" and that any future development would not block the view from
the condos in question. However, a new project was subsequently
developed that blocked the condo purchasers' view. The purchasers filed
suit against the developers for negligent supervision of their brokers
based on the brokers' departure from the sales script that warned of the
uncertainty of future developments."' The court held that the plaintiffs
failed to provide any specifically pled facts to support their legal
conclusions that the developer had any actual knowledge of the brokers'
departure from the script or that the brokers had a tendency to do so.6"
Accordingly, the negligent supervision claim was dismissed. 3
VI.

A.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Overview

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees
committed within the scope of his or her employment." To hold an
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following
two elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in
furtherance of the employer's business; and (2) the employee was acting
within the scope of the employer's business. 5
B.

Independent Contractoror Employee

Vicarious liability under respondeat superior generally does not apply
to the acts of independent contractors. 6
Therefore, in determining

59. 290 Ga. 186, 718 S.E.2d 304 (2011).
60. Id. at 190-91, 718 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting Leo v. Waffle House, Inc., 298 Ga. App.
838, 841, 681 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2009)).
61. Id. at 186-87, 718 S.E.2d at 306-07.
62. Id. at 191, 718 S.E.2d at 310.
63. Id.
64. CHARLES R. ADAMS, III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 7-2 (2011-2012 ed.).
65. Id.
66. See O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2000) (noting that"[ain employer generally is not responsible
for torts committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business
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vicarious liability, a court must initially resolve whether an individual
is an independent contractor or an employee.67
In Georgia Messenger Service, Inc. v. Bradley,"5 the Georgia Court of
Appeals considered whether a courier, who was classified as an
independent contractor in the contract with the employer, was actually
an employee, and whether the employer could be held liable for his
negligence.6 9 John W.S. Wise, Jr. (Wise), a courier for Georgia Messenger Service, was involved in an altercation with Bradley, a security
guard, while attempting to make a delivery. Bradley sued Georgia
Messenger Service under the doctrine of respondeat superior for Wise's
conduct.70
To determine liability, the court examined whether Wise's contractually designated status as an independent contractor precluded the
employer's liability for his tortious conduct. 1 The test for determining
when an employer exercises sufficient control over an independent
contractor's work to make the employer vicariously liable for the
contractor's actions is
whether "the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to
control the time, manner, and method of the performance of the work,
as distinguished from the right to merely require certain definite
results in conformity with the contract." Put another way, "the test is
essentially whether the contractor has a bona fide existence apart from
the employer or functions instead as the employer's alter ego.72
Here, Wise's contract obligated him to perform duties on behalf of the
employer as they were assigned to him, he had no choice as to which
jobs he would perform, he could only work for Georgia Messenger
Service, and the delivery vehicle could only be used by Georgia
Messenger Service.73 The terms of the contract created a genuine issue
of material fact, and the court denied Georgia Messenger Service's
motion for summary judgment.7 4

and in it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer").
67. See id.; see also ADAMS, supra note 64, at § 8-1 (noting that "[a]n 'independent
contractor' is one who, in the pursuit of his own independent business, undertakes to
perform a task for another, while retaining for himself the right to control the means,
method and manner of its accomplishment").
68. 311 Ga. App. 148, 715 S.E.2d 699 (2011).
69. Id. at 150, 715 S.E.2d at 702.
70. Id. at 148-49, 715 S.E.2d at 701.
71. Id. at 150, 715 S.E.2d at 702.
72. Id. (quoting Slater v. Canal Wood Corp. of Augusta, 178 Ga. App. 877, 878, 345
S.E.2d 71, 72 (1986)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 151-52, 715 S.E.2d at 703-04.
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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

A.

Overview
Effective May 11, 2011, the Georgia Constitution was amended to
authorize the enforcement of restrictive covenants that restrain in a
reasonable manner. 5 In 2009, the General Assembly approved House
Rule 1786 to put the constitutional amendment on the November 2010
ballot, but the resolution did not specify an effective date." The
General Assembly then enacted House Bill 17378 to authorize restrictive covenants, effective the day after the vote, since Georgia citizens
were expected to approve the constitutional amendment.79 Georgia
voters approved the amendment on November 2, 2010, but pursuant to
the state constitution, the effective date would be January 1, 2011, since
the amendment lacked an effective date." Conversely, House Bill 173
went into effect on November 3, 2010.1 The General Assembly passed
House Bill 302 to repeal House Bill 173 and to rectify the gap between
the effective date and the constitutional amendment.' House Bill 30
was signed and became effective on May 11, 2011 and applies "to
contracts entered into on and after [its effective date,] and [it] shall not
apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants
entered into before such date."'
Prior to this constitutional amendment, courts upheld noncompete
agreements that merely placed a partial restraint on trade.8 5 However,
agreements that placed general restraints on trade were void as against
public policy.88 Prior to the amendment' courts disfavored noncompete
agreements on contractual relations because any restriction on trade
reduced competition.8 7 Pursuant to the 1983 Georgia Constitution, a

75. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (2010 & Supp. 2012); GA. CONST. of 1983, art. In, § 6, para.
5(c)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2012).
76. Ga. H.R. Res. 178, Reg. Sess. (2009).
77. See id.; see also Becham v. Synthes, No. 11-14495, 2012 WL 1994604, at *1 (11th
Cir. June 4, 2012).
78. Ga. H.R. Bill 173, Reg. Seas. (2009).
79. Becham, 2012 WL 1994604, at *1.
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id.
82. Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess. (2011).
83. Becham, 2012 WL 1994604, at *1.
84. Id. (alteration in original); see also Ga. H.R. Bill 30, § 5, Reg. Seas. (2011).
85. WIMBERLY, supra note 32, at 108.
86. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
87. WIMBERLY, supra note 32, at 107.
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judge had the power to limit the "duration, geographic area, and scope
of prohibited activities provided in a contract or agreement restricting
or regulating competitive activities.' 8 However, the Georgia Court of
Appeals has recognized that the new version of the statute will not apply
to restrictive covenants that predate the amendment.89 For these prior
covenants, a noncompete agreement is valid as a partial restraint on
trade when the agreement is specific and reasonable in regard to
duration, territorial coverage, and the scope of activities prohibited.0
Whether the terms of a noncompete agreement are reasonable is a
question of law that takes into account "the nature and extent of the
trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all other relevant
circumstances."9 ' A questionable restriction, if not void on its face, may
require the introduction of additional facts to determine whether it is
reasonable. 2 However, depending on the type of contract, courts apply
different levels of scrutiny in determining the reasonableness of the
contract. 93 If a noncompete agreement is ancillary to an employment
agreement, a stricter standard applies;9 if any portion of that agreement is considered overbroad or unreasonable, the entire agreement
becomes invalid.9 5 If the agreement is pursuant to a contract for the sale
of a business, a less stringent standard permits broader provisions; even
if provisions of that agreement are deemed overbroad or unreasonable,
the court may "blue pencil" the agreement, rewriting or severing the
overly broad provisions.9 6 However, "in restrictive covenant cases
strictly scrutinized as employment contracts, Georgia does not employ
the 'blue pencil' doctrine of severability."97

88. GA. CONST. of 1983, art. Il, § 6, para. 5(cX3).
89. Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 30, 706 S.E.2d 660, 664
(2011).
90. Id. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664; see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464,465,422
S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).
91. Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585,484 S.E.2d 323,325 (1997)
(citing W.R. Grace & Co., 262 Ga. at 465 n.1, 422 S.E.2d at 531 n.1).
92. Koger Props., Inc. v. Adains-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 69, 274 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1981).
93. See WIMBERLY, supra note 32, at 108-09.
94. See id. at 110.
95. Drumheller v. Drumheller Bag & Supply, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 623, 626, 420 S.E.2d
331, 334 (1992) (citing Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 253 Ga. 671, 672, 324 S.E.2d 175, 177
(1985)) (discussing that courts have held covenants not to compete "to be nonseverable and
ha[vel held that overbreadth of one portion of the covenant so taints the entire covenant
as to make it unenforceable").
96. Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320, 551
S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001).
97. Id. The court in Advance Technology also stated that "Georgia courts have
traditionally divided restrictive covenants into two categories: 'covenants ancillary to an
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Georgia Public Policy
During the survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit examined the enforceability of a restrictive covenant
entered into after voters approved the amendment and the November 3,
2010 effective date of House Bill 173 but prior to the May 11, 2011
effective date of House Bill 30.98 In Becham v. Synthes, 9 Becham
signed four restrictive covenants as part of his employment contract with
Synthes in 2000. In November 2010, Becham informed his manager that
he was leaving Synthes at the end of the year. Synthes agreed to pay
Becham commissions on January 15, 2011, in exchange for a promise to
honor the restrictive covenants in January 2011. Becham accepted the
terms in December 2010. However, after Becham received his commission, he sought a declaration that the restrictive covenants were
unenforceable and began working for a competitor of Synthes. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Becham and applied
Georgia law to the restrictive covenants, notwithstanding a contractual
provision choosing Pennsylvania law.1°°
Generally, a choice-of-law provision is enforceable in Georgia.' 1
However, this provision may be unenforceable in Georgia if the
application of the law from another jurisdiction would violate the public
policy of Georgia. 0 2 Synthes argued that "Georgia's public policy
shifted in November 2010 to support the broad enforcement of restrictive
covenants" and that the district court should have considered Georgia's
new public policy. 10 3
The court of appeals noted that House Bill 173, by its terms, would be
effective on November 3, 2010, and applied to "all contracts entered on
Moreover, Becham agreed to honor the covenants on
or after."1'
B.

employment contract, which receive strict scrutiny and are not blue-penciled, and
covenants ancillary to a sale of business, which receive much less scrutiny and may be
blue-penciled.'" Id. at 319, 551 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v.
Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289, 289-90, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998)). However, the recent
amendment to the Georgia Constitution permits courts to "blue pencil" restrictive
covenants ancillary to employment contracts. See supra Part VII.2A.

98. Becham v. Synthes, No. 11-14495, 2012 WL 1994604, at *1 (11th Cir. June 4,
2012).

99. No. 11-14495, 2012 WL 1994604 (11th Cir. June 4, 2012).
100. Id. at *2-3.
101. Id. at *3 (citing Carr v. Kupfer, 250 Ga. 106, 107, 296 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1982)).

102. Id. (citing Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 239 Ga. 675, 676, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1977)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *4.
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December 1, 2010.105 These circumstances would ordinarily render the
covenants enforceable; however, House Bill 173 is "unconstitutional and
void." 1' The court stated, "In Georgia, a statute's constitutionality is
tested at the time it was passed." 1' At the moment House Bill 173
went into effect on November 3, 2010, the General Assembly still did not
have the power to authorize the enforcement of restrictive covenants.'0 8 Therefore, even though a constitutional amendment authorizing House Bill 173 went into effect on January 1, 2011, the act could
not be saved. 109 Finally, the court noted that "[iun Georgia, the only
way to 'revive' an unconstitutional statute is to reenact that statute."110
The General Assembly did eventually pass House Bill 30 to correct
House Bill 173."' However, House Bill 30 went into effect on May 11,
2011, and "does not apply 'in actions determining the enforceability of
restrictive covenants entered into before' May 11, 2011.,,112

Conse-

quently, the restrictive covenants in question were not covered by House
Bill 30.113 The court of appeals upheld the district court's decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of Becham." 4
Similarly, in Boone v. Corestaff Support Services, Inc.,' the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia examined
whether a choice-of-law provision that applies another jurisdiction's law6
violates Georgia public policy in the context of restrictive covenants."
Boone signed a noncompete agreement in December 2008. While the
agreement lacked a forum-selection clause, it had a choice-of-law
provision stating that Delaware law governed. Boone left his position
with Corestaff in April 2011 to work for a competitor. Later that month,
Boone filed suit in Georgia in an effort to prevent Corestaff from
enforcing the restrictive covenant not to compete. Corestaff filed suit in
Delaware and sought to have the Georgia action dismissed in accordance

105.

106.
107.
94, 102
108.
(1991)).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.

Id.
Id. (citing Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues of Fulton Cnty. v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792,793S.E.2d 180, 182-83 (1958)).
Id. (citing Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 261 Ga. 371,372,405 S.E.2d 253, 254-55
Id.
Id.
See Ga. H.R. Bill 30.
Becham, 2012 WL 1994604, at *4; see also Ga. H.R. Bill 30 § 5.
Becham, 2012 WL 1994604, at *4.
Id. at *6.
805 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
Id. at 1368-69.
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with the choice-of-law provision of the noncompete and employment
agreement. 117

Delaware law governing restrictive covenants in employment
agreements is permissive and does not violate the new Georgia public
However, since the
policy that went into effect in May 2011.1
agreement in question was signed in 2008, the court must apply the law
Since the agreement
as it existed prior to the recent amendment.'
between Boone and Corestaff allows for the application of the "blue
pencil" rule and Georgia prohibited such a rule prior to 2011, the
agreement violated Georgia public policy. 120 As such, the "choice-oflaw provision choosing the law of a foreign jurisdiction may not be
applied to enforce the covenant."'
Scope of ProhibitedActivities
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals applied a
three element test to assess the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant
entered into under Georgia law prior to the 2011 amendment. 122 In
Murphree v. Yancey Brothers Co.,123 Murphree entered into a restrictive covenant with Yancey that prohibited him from soliciting clients for
the purposes of competing, which were procured by Murphree on behalf
of Yancey and for a term of two years following his termination of
employment. However, prior to leaving his job with Yancey, Murphree
copied company files to a thumb drive and then to his work computer at
his new job with Flint, a competitor of Yancey. Murphree then contacted
his former clients and submitted bids on behalf of Flint. Yancey sought,
and was granted, an interlocutory injunction by the trial court to prevent
further compromise of trade secrets.2
The court of appeals assessed the duration, territorial coverage, and
scope of prohibited activity to determine reasonableness. 2 ' Murphree
challenged the restrictive covenant claiming it was "invalid and
unenforceable because it fail[ed] to limit or define the scope of activity
C.

117. Id. at 1366-68.
118. Id. at 1369.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 276 Ga. 808, 810, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85-86
(2003)).
122. Murphree v. Yancey Bros. Co., 311 Ga. App. 744, 747, 716 S.E.2d 824,827 (2011).
123. 311 Ga. App. 744, 716 S.E.2d 824 (2011).
124. Id. at 744-46, 716 S.E.2d at 825-26.
125. Id. at 747-48, 716 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Reardigan v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 238 Ga.
App. 142, 143, 518 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1999)).
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prohibited."2 ' The court held that the scope of the activity was
properly defined because the contract expressly prohibited soliciting
clients procured by a former employee for the purposes of competing.'2 7
The covenant was reasonable because it "prohibited Murphree from
initiating affirmative action to compete with Yancey by contacting
former customers, but the clause would not have precluded him 'from
28 Accordaccepting unsolicited business from the forbidden
29 clients.''
affirmed.
was
injunction
ingly, the interlocutory
Conversely, in Fantastic Sams Salons Corp. v. Maxie Enterprises,
Inc.,180 a franchisee signed a restrictive covenant in 2008 that prohibited competing within five miles of the franchise location for two years
and competing within two and one-half miles of any Fantastic Sams
Salon for ten years.'
The court held that, applying pre-ratification
law, "restrictive covenants in franchise agreements are subject to strict
scrutiny, and they 'must be reasonable as to time, territory[,] and
scope."" 32 Moreover, since the covenant prohibited the franchisee from
serving in any capacity in any business that engaged in a similar
business to Fantastic
Sams, the covenant is overbroad and has an
33
unreasonable scope.
Similarly, in Clark v. Johnson Truck Bodies, LLC,"' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia examined the
reasonableness of a noncompete clause entered into prior to the amended
restrictive covenant law in 2011.' a' Clark entered into an employment
contract that contained a noncompete provision with Johnson. The
agreement prohibited Clark from engaging in any business that
competes with Johnson's products for eighteen months and did not
contain any limitations to a specified territory.'3 6

126. Id. at 747, 716 S.E.2d at 827.
127. Id. at 748-49, 716 S.E.2d at 828.
128. Id. at 749, 716 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting Baggett, 231 Ga. App. at 298, 498 S.E.2d
at 355); cf Waldeck v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 590, 592, 583 S.E.2d 266, 268 (2003)
(noting that "a covenant prohibiting a former employee from merely accepting business,
without any solicitation, is not reasonable").
129. Murphree, 311 Ga. App. at 749, 716 S.E.2d at 828.
130. No. 3:11-CV-22, 2012 WL 210889, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 24, 2012).
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id. (quoting Atlanta Bread Co. Intl v. Lupton-Smith, 285 Ga. 587, 589-90, 679
S.E.2d 722, 724 (2009)).
133. Id. at *3.
134. No. CV411-132, 2012 WL 1014827, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2012).
135. Id. at *4-6.
136. Id. at *1.
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The court applied Georgia's law of restrictive covenants as it was in
2008, since that was when the agreement was entered into. 137 The
restriction on Clark from involvement in any business that competes
with Johnson for eighteen months in any territory was "overly unreasonable on the effects it ha[d]. " 38
' The court held that "[blecause these
provisions are invalid under Georgia's pre-ratification law, and is not
capable of being 'blue-penciled' by the Court, the entire covenant must
fail."139
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues in Georgia law often are not as
complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising under state law
are becoming more challenging each year. Adding to this challenge is
a growing overlap between state and federal issues. Regardless of
whether a practitioner professes to specialize in state, federal, administrative, or trial law, it is important to recognize that any one law or
legal proceeding can and does impact other relations between employer
and employee.

137. Id. at *5 (citing Boone v. Corestaff Servs., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1369 (N.D. Ga.
2011)).
138. Id. at *6.
139. Id.

